David Shaw on 7 Feb 2004 03:22:02 -0000


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Re: [PLUG] Jeff's and my paranoia.


On Thu, Feb 05, 2004 at 11:39:29PM -0500, gabriel rosenkoetter wrote:
> Summed up well in Jörgen Cederlöf's signing policy:
> 
>   http://www.lysator.liu.se/~jc/signing-policy.html

This is a fairly standard policy.  I do something similar.  There is a
weakness in the protocol, but it's questionable how serious it is.

His requirement that he is already connected to someone before he
signs their key is a little odd, but that's his priviledge.

With regards to this nonsense though:

     If I have had contact with someone through signed or encrypted
     e-mail over a time long enough to rule out at least temporary
     man-in-the-middle attacks, and I have verified the key with a key
     downloaded from his/her personal web page, or signed
     emails/fingerprints on public mailing lists, but I have not met
     the person or verified the key in any other way, I may sign the
     key with cert check level one.

I'll spare you all a rant on the subject, and content myself with
parsing the above statement:

  "I may sign keys when I have not met the person or verified the
  key."

This is a dreadful, dreadful idea.  Remember that the check level
numbers are for human reading - the computer, when building the web of
trust, treats all signatures the same.  His unchecked signatures, made
without any verification at all, carry the same weight as signatures
where people actually bothered to do it right.  There goes the web of
trust.

People who do this get an automatic "never trust" in my trustdb.

David

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