Tobias DiPasquale on 16 Feb 2005 23:37:44 -0000


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Re: [PLUG] http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/sha1_broken.html


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On Feb 16, 2005, at 4:48 PM, John Fiore wrote:
DES keys are 56 bits, which makes it 8192 times as
hard on average, not 32.

I said full DES, which uses a 64 bit key. Standard DES uses a 56 bit key.


The paper hasn't been released yet, but as I
understand it, this is just to generate one collision.
It doesn't mean that if you have a hash that you can
create another object that has the same hash value.

The point of a cryptographic message digest is to produce a unique and irreversible transformation on the data source within the period. If an implementation fails this premise it should not be used since the cryptographic implementations that include such a digest require it to provide those properties in order to perform their functions correctly. If one piece is failing, the integrity of the entire chain is at risk.


Also, only in public key cryptography do there exist better-than-brute-force attacks possible against a technique that don't render that technique "broken" (e.g. QFS, NFS). SHA-1 is not public key cryptography.

This still takes 2^(160) operations.

This is the worst case. The average case would be approximately 2**80 iterations.


Of course you can string many machines together to do
this in parallel, and there's Moore's Law, and while I
agree with you that there's nothing wrong with
switching to SHA-256, 385, or 512, I just don't think
that there's any reason for everyone to go bananas.

I never advocated going bananas. I advocated replacing SHA-1 with an as-yet-unbroken message digest algorithm. If the lock broke on your front door, wouldn't you replace it?


The real problem here is that SHA-* and RIPEMD* are all based on the same unbalanced Feistel network structure and are thus potentially vulnerable to the same type of attack. I would like to see cryptographic implementations start to implement MDs that do not use this technique.

- --
Tobias DiPasquale
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