Rich Freeman on 29 Jan 2015 19:26:22 -0800 |
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Re: [PLUG] Article on 'cyberwarfare' |
On Thu, Jan 29, 2015 at 4:44 PM, Christopher Barry <christopher.r.barry@gmail.com> wrote: > what IS happening, now, is that there is a > media blitz going on designed to further the agendas of the surveillance > states around the world through FUD, e.g. outlawing end-to-end > encryption, forcing backdoors into 'sanctioned' encryption technologies > and operating systems and 'cloud' technologies, slurping up every byte > of traffic in massive dragnet types of data collection, stingrays, > plate readers, location tracking, the proliferation of closed > proprietary firmware, and the very BIOSes of the hardware we use and > ideally can trust. and on, and on... The other new development is that there is far more data with connectivity to the internet, and that recent attacks include provisions for penetrating sneakernets. The whole Sony attack is the first attack of that kind of magnitude, and is a VERY real threat for any business. People seem to pick on them, but every large business I've seen is in a very similar security state - typically a decent firewall and almost nothing past that with every workstation/server reachable from anywhere on the network. Large scale data breaches are becoming commonplace, and the whole design of our credit card system seems to be nearing the breaking point (the shared secret that you share with everybody). Attacks are also becoming more targeted. These days it isn't just script kiddies and hackers interested in a challenge. Now you have corporate espionage, national espionage, and ransom being conducted by organized groups. Hacking has become a profession. So, sure, network intrusions have been happening forever, but the impact of that is growing both due to the purposefulness of the attacks, and the criticality of the resources being attacked. > centralizing security is a fools folly. for every ridiculously > expensive and complex measure is a cheap and simple counter-measure, > and 'bad guys' will always find and exploit it[1][2]. It has worked just fine for national borders. Your corporate security department doesn't have to worry about confronting a main battle tank at the guardhouse. A "great firewall" wouldn't be just perimeter defense either. The whole point is to have a two-tier system. On the border you keep the bad guys out. On the inside you detect and prosecute computer crimes. If you hack into a company from a US ISP, you're almost certainly going to get caught by the FBI and locked up. The problem is that many attacks are mounted from countries that do not effectively prosecute computer crimes. If those countries were not connected to the network, then you wouldn't have the same kind of risks. Sure, they could mail you a USB drive, or try to sneak somebody into a public WiFi, but it isn't the same as just having an office building full of black hats in some foreign country. > Then the Viet Cong began putting lookouts with > radios in ever increasing rings around important targets. when an F-111 > flew over, they would vector the flight path, radio ahead to guys that > would fire mortars of chaff into the air. Cite? I couldn't find anything about this online. Also, you're talking about war here. If you fly high, some pilots are going to die. If you fly low, some pilots are going to die. If pilots dying was the primary concern, they wouldn't have been sent into a warzone. In the end you need to look at what kind of technology and tactics result in the greatest impact on the enemy at a reasonable cost to your own forces. > > [2] > http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran-hijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-engineer-Video > and a lesson here too Yeah, don't believe everything the Iraqi information minister says. :) There are no credible sources for this as far as I'm aware, and which seems more likely to anybody who has flown a plane and worked in IT: 1. A single-engine aircraft suffered some kind of mechanical problem resulting in a forced landing and a dictatorship decided to take the credit for downing it. 2. The Iranians managed to hack the encrypted and authenticated communications and navigation systems on exactly one state-of-the-art military drone. I'm sure these systems were audited by the NSA, and out-witting them on an encryption system seems fairly unlikely. People mention GPS spoofing, but GPS also has authentication available for military receivers (but not civilian ones). -- Rich ___________________________________________________________________________ Philadelphia Linux Users Group -- http://www.phillylinux.org Announcements - http://lists.phillylinux.org/mailman/listinfo/plug-announce General Discussion -- http://lists.phillylinux.org/mailman/listinfo/plug