David A. Harding on 21 May 2009 10:55:56 -0700 |
On Thu, May 21, 2009 at 12:26:26PM -0400, K.S. Bhaskar wrote: > [A]ppending a known (to an attacker) string to an unknown key doesn't > reduce the randomness in the key. The counter argument is that if the > [...] hash has [...] known bits [...], [it] is more easily broken. It follows logically that hashes with known parts are more easily broken than hashes without known parts in flawed hash functions. In unflawed hash functions, if such exists, or in hash functions where the attacker doesn't know of any flaws, the avalanche effect[1] ensures the unknown parts remain secret. [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avalanche_effect -Dave -- David A. Harding Website: http://dtrt.org/ 1 (609) 997-0765 Email: dave@dtrt.org Jabber/XMPP: dharding@jabber.org ___________________________________________________________________________ Philadelphia Linux Users Group -- http://www.phillylinux.org Announcements - http://lists.phillylinux.org/mailman/listinfo/plug-announce General Discussion -- http://lists.phillylinux.org/mailman/listinfo/plug
|
|