Rich Freeman on 1 Feb 2015 16:51:16 -0800 |
[Date Prev] [Date Next] [Thread Prev] [Thread Next] [Date Index] [Thread Index]
Re: [PLUG] Article on 'cyberwarfare' |
On Sun, Feb 1, 2015 at 9:36 AM, Paul Walker <starsinmypockets@gmail.com> wrote: > I posted the article to try and prompt a conversation, but the conversation > that ensued seems to address a different topic - not so much the idea of war > taking place on the internet. Instead we seem to be discussing the idea of > crime on the internet. Obviously they're related in that the only real difference is one of scale and who the actors are. I think one of the core issue is that internet-connected systems are becoming increasingly more important to the overall economy, but the political/legal climate hasn't really involved. If a state actor blew up the Sony Headquarters with dynamite, we'd be bombing them. If they destroy the majority of their market value via computer intrusion, we consider it a diplomatic matter at best. Stronger enforcement of laws and firewalling at the national level when this is not agreed upon would probably help with the computer crime element. It might not be as helpful for dealing with cyber-warfare. A country might agree to enforce laws against computer crime and follow through, but then if we went to war with them they might launch a crippling attack without warning, and perhaps companies would lower their guard due to the more peaceful climate online overall and be more susceptible to attack. Even cutting off a country's network access is going to be of limited use when it is easy to use wireless telecommunications/etc to get around national borders. I don't think that improved corporate security is much of a solution either. Any software of any complexity is bound to have unknown critical vulnerabilities. Anybody who is determined can probably find those vulnerabilities and exploit them. Security by obscurity would probably protect you from mass attacks, but it would probably also make you more vulnerable to targeted attacks. When you're talking about national actors you can't just deploy all the published security updates and assume you're safe. Anybody mounting cyber-attacks for military purposes is going to be hiring people just as talented as anybody you know, and they're going to be paid to do nothing but crack servers/routers/printers/you-name-its 40 hours per week, with support on the applications, OS, hardware, etc side, and no risk of punishment whatsoever for the consequences of their activities. Honestly, I think the only real defense is to air-gap anything that is critical to national defense or basic infrastructure (power, water, etc). As we've seen with Stuxnet that isn't a perfect layer of security, but it is obviously far better than just having everything online. Infrastructure also tends to be run by companies that aren't subject to free-market competition, so regulators could require them to provide that security and ensure they are compensated for it. The other side of all of this is that security is rarely rewarded by the market. Would you pay more to buy stuff in the store if the store went through some kind of certification process to demonstrate that they're less likely to lose your credit card info? In theory they all go through PCI/etc anyway, and when you're talking state actors what assurance could certification even provide. -- Rich ___________________________________________________________________________ Philadelphia Linux Users Group -- http://www.phillylinux.org Announcements - http://lists.phillylinux.org/mailman/listinfo/plug-announce General Discussion -- http://lists.phillylinux.org/mailman/listinfo/plug