ac on 21 Oct 2016 13:33:52 -0700

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Re: [PLUG] spamassassin help: create a rule to score by sender TLD

I think I need to break it down for you some more....

What you are advocating is a 'closed" Internet.

An Internet where the "receivers" decide what they will be receiving


You completely miss the point of the Internet.

It is not a "one way" street

Your receivers may decide to not receive my emails asd my address is @me

If I then decide to also stop receiving your crap, what is the result?

On Fri, 21 Oct 2016 16:26:10 -0400
Rich Kulawiec <> wrote:

> On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 08:33:49PM +0200, ac wrote:
> > Where in truth, you do not even consider for a second that you may
> > actually be wrong.
> Apparently you missed the lengthy explanation of why it's important
> to make (the inevitable) mistakes in a way that facilitates their
> correction, and the notes about performing due diligence with log
> files.
> > On the Internet and as far as abuse, ddos and bots go, we use all 
> > network layers, sometimes null routing /8 for a period - long before
> > they even hit any border or puny email server 
> I'm aware.  I've been advocating defense-in-depth tactics, starting
> at the network perimeter, for a very long time.  I've lost count of
> the number of times I've told folks to use the Spamhaus DROP (and now,
> EDROP) lists at the perimeter, or advised null-routing hijacked
> networks, or pointed folks at BCP 38, or or or.
> And part of that is not accepting any traffic that you don't have to,
> because every possible outcome of that is bad for you and good for
> abusers and attackers.
> Go look at today's discussion on NANOG about the DDoS.  Really.  Go
> read it.  It's quite instructive.  And then realize that it's
> possible because way too many people have way too many systems
> running way too many services in default-permit mode, and that allows
> them to be weaponized against third parties.  Yeah, some of that
> would still happen even if they had the professional diligence to
> lock everything down as tightly as possible, but it might cut things
> down to a dull roar.  It might give the targets a fighting chance.
> It would certainly be an improvement.
> But unfortunately, that hasn't happened yet.  Too many people are
> running systems like it's still 1986.  I wish it were (in the sense
> of mutual cooperation) but it's not, and we're not going back.
> Everyone should be doing detailed analysis of their operational
> requirements and permitting only the minimum necessary.  That applies
> not just to SMTP but to SSH, HTTP, and every other service/protocol
> in play.
> ---rsk
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